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THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON
NATIONAL ABORTION LAWS
Kelsey Zorzi+
In 2000, the United Nations (UN) entity that monitors Member States’
compliance with the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women—the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—lodged an official
complaint against Luxembourg, claiming that its abortion laws “appear
anachronistic,” and its government “appears to lack the commitment to review
and adapt [abortion] legislation to changing attitudes and developments in the
European region.”1 The abortion laws of Luxembourg were not, at the time, out
of step with international law, which does not require States to legalize abortion.2
Luxembourg already allowed abortion in many circumstances, including
whenever a physician determined that a pregnancy threatened a woman’s life or
health, in cases of rape, incest, or fetal impairment, and even simply for social
or economic reasons.3 Yet, because Luxembourg did not permit on-demand
abortion, it was subject to censure by a United Nations body.4

+
Kelsey Zorzi serves as U.N. counsel with ADF International. She represents ADF International
at the United Nations by providing U.N. Member State representatives with key legal resources and
language amendments that promote religious freedom and the inherent value and dignity of every
person. Zorzi earned her J.D. at George Washington University Law School in 2013, where she
participated in the GW-Oxford International Human Rights Law Program and won first place in
the 2013 National Religious Freedom Moot Court Competition. Prior to graduating from law
school, Zorzi interned with the U.S. Department of Justice and the International Centre for Missing
& Exploited Children. Zorzi is admitted to the state bars in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut.
1. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on its TwentyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/55/38, ¶ 406 (June 30, 2000), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
cedaw/reports/a5538.pdf [hereinafter “Rep. of CEDAW: Luxembourg 2000”]. This was not the
first time CEDAW pressured Luxembourg to liberalize its abortion laws; for example, the
Committee noted in its 1997 report that it was “deeply concerned at the existing legislation on
abortion” in Luxembourg because it “penalized women.” U.N. Concluding Comments of the
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at ¶ 210 (June 25, 1997), http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cedaw/cedaw-luxembourg.htm [hereinafter “Concluding Comments of
CEDAW: Luxembourg 1997”].
2. See U.N. Population Div., Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Major Dimensions of Abortion
Policy Part II.B.1 (2002), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/ (discussing
how abortion laws are governed by State legislation, and no international standard yet exists).
3. De l’avortement [Abortion] [Penal Code] tit. VII, ch. 1, art. 353 (Nov. 15, 1978) (Lux.),
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/abortion/LUXEMBOURG.abo.htm.
4. See Rep. of CEDAW: Luxembourg 2000, supra note 1, ¶ 406.
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This censure had no basis in international law, but its insubstantial legal
grounding did not prevent it from being ultimately effective.5 In 2012,
Luxembourg legalized abortion on-demand, and admitted that the change was
partially made to ensure it was in step with the laws of other European countries.6
Prior to taking this step, however, Luxembourg joined the now-widespread
practice of pressuring Latin American nations to change their abortion laws
through the UN’s Universal Periodic Review.7 In 2010, during the seventh
session of the Universal Periodic Review, Luxembourg recommended that El
Salvador “[i]nitiate a national dialogue on the right of women to reproductive
health, including with respect to the consequences of restrictive laws on
abortion, including the criminalization of abortion.”8
This brief history of the UN’s interaction with Luxembourg illustrates a trend
that deserves significantly more attention than it has received. Working beyond
its mandate and outside the scope of international law, the UN, through its
various organs and bodies, has developed a complex, energetic, and potent
system to pressure States to adopt certain domestic abortion laws.9 There is
evidence that the UN’s fervent advocacy for abortion has contributed to
changing abortion laws, despite the fact that the life of the unborn child is
protected under international law.10
5. See Hillary White, Luxembourg Legalises Abortion on Demand, LIFESITE (Nov. 23, 2012,
1:34 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/luxembourg-legalises-abortion-on-demand.
6. See Charline Lebrun, Restrictions on Abortion in Luxembourg To Be Relaxed,
LUXEMBURGER WORT (Nov. 23, 2012, 7:39 AM), http://www.wort.lu/en/luxembourg/restrictionson-abortion-in-luxembourg-to-be-relaxed-50af1938e4b0246412999677; White, supra note 5. In
2014, the government of Luxembourg liberalized abortion law to an even greater extent by
removing the requirements that women undergo a second consultation with a medical doctor and
show they are under distress because of their pregnancy. See Luxembourg Decriminalises
Abortion, GÈNÉTHIQUE (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.genethique.org/en/content/luxembourgdecriminalises-abortion#.VpPobJMrKA8. In practice, however, the requirement of showing
distress never prevented a woman from obtaining an abortion. See id.
7. See Luxembourg Recommendation to El Salvador, http://www.upr-info.org/database/ (in
the drop down menus, select “El Salvador” for State Under Review, “Luxembourg” for
Recommending State, “Women’s Rights” for Issue, “1st Cycle” for Cycle, and “Recommendations
and Voluntary Pledges” for Recommendations & Voluntary Pledges; then click on Go; the source
is the third result).
8. Id.
9. See Press Release, Irish Family Planning Assoc., Government Under Pressure at the UN
re Implementation of Abortion Ruling (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.ifpa.ie/news/irish-government
-under-pressure-at-un; Stefano Gennarini, Nigeria Refuses To Give in to UN Pressure on Abortion,
‘Sexual Rights’, LIFESITE (Sep. 19, 2015, 2:39 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/unfpafoiled-by-nigeria-on-abortion-sexual-rights; Rebecca Oas, UN Human Rights System Becomes ProAbortion Echo Chamber, C-FAM (Nov. 26, 2014), https://c-fam.org/friday_fax/un-human-rightssystem-becomes-pro-abortion-echo-chamber/.
10. Various international instruments recognize the right to life of the unborn child. For
example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly states, “the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth.” G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Preamble, Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989), http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-declaration/. In
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While both legislators and judges have cited international treaties as having
informed their decisions, the story of the influence of international law on
domestic abortion laws is primarily one of the growing influence of soft law
produced in and through UN bodies.11 Because no international treaty refers to
a right to abortion, UN actors interested in promoting access to abortion have
increasingly relied on a particular interpretation of the relationship between soft
law and customary international law.12 Some now argue that it is possible for
customary international law to develop out of a series of soft law documents.13
addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the death penalty for
pregnant women, which is intended to protect the right of the life of the unborn. See G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI) art. 6, § 5, International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (Mar. 23, 1976),
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm. As the draft of the International Covenants
on Human Rights states: “The principal reason for providing in paragraph 4 of the original text that
the death sentence should not be carried out on pregnant women was to save the life of an innocent
unborn child.” G.A. Rep. of the Third Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3764 (Dec. 6, 1957)
(emphasis added).
11. See Stefano Gennarini, Court in Argentina Cites UN ‘Experts’ To Establish ‘Right’ to
Abortion, LIFESITE (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/court-in-argentina-cites-unexperts-to-establish-right-to-abortion.
12. Id. Customary international law—the norms that have evolved over time in the
international system, such as norms about the treatment of ambassadors—are understood to be the
only binding international law other than treaties. See Richard G. Wilkins & Jacob Reynolds,
International Law and the Right to Life, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 128‒30 (2006).
13. Historically, international law was limited in scope, but attempts to reshape international
law are best understood in the context of the recent worldwide shift regarding the relationship
between international and domestic law. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 12, at 125‒28. The core
of international law is comprised of treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia, outlining the
relationships between nations regarding war, commerce, and boundary disputes. Id. at 127. Today,
treaty law has expanded to “deal not only with the obligations of nations, but also with the rights
of individuals.” Id. Wilkins and Reynolds correctly identify the three most significant elements
contributing to the increasing prominence of international law: (1) the expanding scope of
international treaties; (2) the increasing rate at which the UN produces soft law norms; and (3) the
increasing willingness of national actors to consult or even defer to international law. Id. at 128‒
29, 131. For example, although Article VI, Clause ii, of the U.S. Constitution states, “all Treaties
made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” in 2005 a U.S. Supreme Court decision cited a
treaty never ratified by the Senate to support its constitutionality determination. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (referencing the UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child);
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Domestic political actors in many nations are showing increased
readiness to ascribe authority to soft law documents produced through UN negotiations, especially
those surrounding the reviews of major UN conferences. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 12, at
128‒29. Another example from the U.S. Supreme Court—the decision in Lawrence v. Texas to
reverse an earlier Supreme Court decision—was partially justified by appeal to statements of
international tribunals. 539 U.S. 558, 572‒73 (2003). As Wilkins and Reynolds point out, “[p]rior
to their citation by the nation’s highest court, these materials would have been considered by most
constitutional scholars as among the ‘softest’ of all possible soft law.” Wilkins & Reynolds, supra
note 12, at 133. Although, the United States is not alone in its willingness to view international
law as normative, the United States has shown itself to be less ready than many other nations to
accede to international norms and pressures. See id. at 154. Around the globe, the relationship
between the individual and the State is now carried out against the backdrop of the norms formed
through discussions of international law. See id. at 127, 131, 133.
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In accordance with this reasoning, the UN has pressured numerous States to
enact more permissive abortion laws via consensus resolutions that emerge from
UN conferences, the recommendations and quasi-judicial functions of the Treaty
Monitoring Bodies (TMBs), and the Human Rights Council’s Universal
Periodic Review (UPR), all of which are non-binding.14 Considering the
statements national legislatures and courts make regarding their motives for
liberalizing their abortion laws, it is clear that the UN holds significant influence
in the realm of domestic abortion laws.
Because this Essay seeks to establish a causal connection between the effects
of UN activities and State abortion laws, the inherent problem of endogeneity
must be addressed. UN initiatives, the independent variable, will be analyzed
relative to changes in domestic abortion laws, the dependent variable. There is
reason to believe that endogeneity may arise between these two variables due to
a causality loop. Specifically, it may be that changing domestic laws lead to
greater UN initiatives, while greater UN initiatives also lead to changing
domestic laws.15 If such a causality loop does exist, determining the direction
of causality in any given instance will be extraordinarily complex. There may
be a second reason for endogeneity. A third variable may be responsible for
causing both the independent and dependent variables: changing global
attitudes.16 This is to say that changing global attitudes may cause both UN
initiatives and domestic abortion laws to change simultaneously.17 Because the
UN is a forum for the expression of global attitudes, there is no infallible way to
differentiate the impact of global attitudes from the impact of UN initiatives.18
Given the extreme complexity of global politics, it is easy to be daunted by these
issues, which may contribute to the dearth of research attempting to assess the
UN’s impact on social laws.19 Nevertheless, the major assumption in this Essay
is that political actors’ reports about their own motivations are relatively
trustworthy. If this assumption is correct, then there is a high probability of at
14. See, e.g., Gennarini, supra note 9; Wendy Wright, Human Rights Watch Pressures
Ecuador To Legalize Abortion, Pro-Life Nation Fights Back, LIFENEWS (Apr. 29, 2015), http://
www.lifenews.com/2015/04/29/human-rights-watch-pressures-ecuador-to-legalize-abortion-prolife-nation-fights-back/; Countries Urge El Salvador To Change Repressive Abortion Laws,
AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/countries-urgeel-salvador-change-repressive-abortion-laws/.
15. See, e.g., supra notes 1‒10 and accompanying text.
16. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on the Status of Women, Statement Submitted by
Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2015/NGO/191 (2015),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.6/2015/NGO/191.
17. See, e.g., supra notes 6‒8 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 16.
19. See Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions
Under Health Care Reform, 15 CUNY L. REV. 391, 399‒400 (2012); Wilkins & Reynolds, supra
note 12, at 123; see, e.g., Shimon Shetreet, The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence
in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International
Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 275,
275‒76, 278 (2009).
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least partial causality when a nation reports that it has changed or will change its
abortion laws in response to UN initiatives.20 This assumption leads to a
methodology focused on agglomerating cases.
I. HOW THE UN ADVOCATES FOR PERMISSIVE ABORTION LAWS
The point of departure for the recent global transformation of abortion laws
was the 1994 adoption of the Programme of Action (PoA) of the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) by 179 States.21 The ICPD,
which oversees a myriad of development issues, from economic growth to
maternal mortality reduction, marked the first time that abortion was officially
introduced and defined as a part of the UN agenda.22 Despite the emphasis on
abortion throughout the text, many Member States worked to ensure that the
document was crafted as much as possible to respect their sovereign authority to
protect life.23
The ICPD is a document of political will with no binding force; however, it is
highly influential because it plays a primary role in the annual Commission on
Population and Development (CPD) at UN Headquarters and in the follow-up
review conferences every five years.24 Abortion activists have attempted to use
the CPD to expand and redefine abortion and undermine States’ sovereign right
to limit or outlaw abortion.25 However, the language of the ICPD is unequivocal.
Although the document is replete with references to abortion, all references are
subject to paragraph 8.25, which states: “In no case should abortion be promoted
as a method of family planning . . . every attempt should be made to eliminate
the need for abortion,” and “[a]ny measures or changes related to abortion . . .
can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national
legislative process.”26 Various Member States expressed reservations, thereby
clarifying their national positions on abortion.27 Thus, the ICPD is a highly

20. See, e.g., White, supra note 5.
21. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 at ch. I,
§ 1, ¶ 8.19, ch. VI, §§ 5‒6, (1994).
22. Id. at ch. I, § 1, ¶ 8.19.
23. See generally id. (noting reservations regarding abortion from El Salvador, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Nicaragua, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Argentina, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, the Holy See, Malta, and Peru).
24. See generally Comm’n on Population & Dev. Res. 2014/1, U.N. Doc. E/2014/25E/CN.9/2014/7 (2014).
25. Pro-life and Family Member States Reject Outcome Document at UN Commission on
Population and Development, ADF INT’L (Apr. 21, 2015), http://adfinternational.org/2015/04/21/
pro-life-and-family-member-states-reject-outcome-document-at-un-commission-on-populationand-development/.
26. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. I, § 1, ¶ 8.25.
27. See Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., Programme of Action, 20th Anniversary
Edition, 187‒88, 190‒92, 194‒201, 204‒05 (2014), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pubpdf/programme_of_action_Web%20ENGLISH.pdf (explaining that the delegations of Honduras,
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nuanced document that underscores States’ sovereign prerogative to determine
their own abortion laws.
Many abortion activists ignore the qualifiers built into the ICPD designed to
limit abortion and seek to promote the document, along with the subsequent
1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as the preeminent guidebook
on which countries should rely on liberalizing their abortion laws.28 For
instance, the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR), a major abortion advocacy
group, wrote in its 2014 briefing paper that at the ICPD, Member States
“recognized that reproductive rights are human rights that are already enshrined
in domestic and international law.”29 While this statement merely reiterates
language in the ICPD,30 its meaning far exceeds the intention of the Member
States that participated in the Conference because the CRR and its affiliate
organizations insist that women have a “right to comprehensive reproductive
health services, including abortion,” even in countries where abortion is illegal.31
As a result of these erroneous interpretations, the ICPD has had a significant
impact on the global development of abortion law, despite lacking the force of
international law and incorporating very clear qualifiers that protect pro-life
Member States.32
Since the adoption of the ICPD, over thirty States have legalized, eased
restrictions on, or expanded access to abortion.33 During that same time period,
only eleven States—seven of which are European or Eurasian countries—have
enacted restrictions on abortion.34 The trend, at least in the developing world, is
toward liberalizing abortion law.35

Nicaragua, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and the Holy See all noted
that they did not support “reproductive rights” if that term included abortion).
28. See supra notes 24‒27; U.N. Secretary-General, The Extent to Which Gender Concerns
Have Been Included in the Activities of the United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, Annex I,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/9 (Aug. 21, 1995), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N95/241/59/PDF/N9524159.pdf?OpenElement; see CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS,
ABORTION WORLDWIDE: 20 YEARS OF REFORM 8, 9 (2014).
29. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 8.
30. See Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. VII, § 1, ¶
7.3 (“[R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national
laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents.”).
31. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, BRINGING RIGHTS TO BEAR: ABORTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2008).
32. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, ICPD AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 20 YEARS OF
ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS THROUGH UN TREATY BODIES AND LEGAL REFORM Part
III, 1‒2 (2013).
33. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, ABORTION WORLDWIDE, supra note 28, at 9.
34. Id. at 21, 25‒26, 31, 33 (listing Japan, Hungary, Russian Federation, Latvia, Slovak
Republic, Germany, Macedonia, Belarus, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the United States at the state
level as countries that have enacted restrictions on abortion).
35. See, e.g., id. at 17 (noting that not a single African country has placed an additional
restriction on abortion in the past twenty years).
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The ICPD entrenched abortion in the official agenda of the UN.36 Since 1994,
the UN has promoted permissive abortion laws in various ways.37 Prominent
mechanisms include the consistent efforts of the United Nations Population
Fund (UNFPA), UN Women, and the World Health Organization (WHO).38
WHO explicitly advocated for the liberalization of abortion laws in its 2012
publication, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health
Systems.39 According to WHO, “[t]he fulfillment of human rights requires that
women can access safe abortion when it is indicated to protect their health,” and
“[t]he protection of women from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
requires that those who have become pregnant as the result of coerced or forced
sexual acts can lawfully access safe abortion services.”40 Moreover, WHO
commends those nations that allow “abortion upon . . . request” for
“recogniz[ing] the conditions for a woman’s free choice,” and cautions against
laws or policies that “impose time limits on the length of pregnancy for which
abortion can be performed.”41
In particular, UNFPA urges that abortion be made accessible to adolescents,
writing in a 2014 publication that “young people require a wide range of sexual
and reproductive health services, including . . . safe abortion care,”42 and in
another publication that “access to sexual and reproductive health services” is
necessary to create conditions under which young people “can achieve their full
potential.”43 The phrase “reproductive health services” is defined in the ICPD
as including abortion in countries where abortion is legal.44
UN Women argues there is a “right to choose” to procure an abortion, and that
governments have a responsibility to assist low-income women in gaining
access.45 Through UN Women, UNFPA, and WHO, the UN has advanced the
perspective that there is an international right to abortion.46
36. See Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, Population Div., Abortion Policies and Reproductive
Health Around the World, at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/343 (2014), http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/AbortionPoliciesReproductiveHealth.pdf.
37. Lauren Barbato, U.N. Declares Abortion Rights Are Human Rights, Promising To Support
Reproductive Rights Worldwide, BUSTLE (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/52634-un
-declares-abortion-rights-are-human-rights-promising-to-support-reproductive-rights-worldwide.
38. See infra notes 39‒46 and accompanying text. Reviewing a sample of the pro-abortion
efforts of these entities is illustrative, but a full review of such efforts would be cumbersome
because there are so many examples.
39. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
HEALTH SYSTEMS 1‒2 (2d ed. 2012).
40. Id. at 92.
41. Id. at 93.
42. MONICA DAS GUPTA ET AL., THE POWER OF 1.8 BILLION: ADOLESCENTS, YOUTH AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FUTURE 37 (UNFPA ed., 2014).
43. UNFPA, ANNUAL REPORT 2014: A YEAR OF RENEWAL 7 (2014).
44. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. XIII, ¶ 13.14(b).
45. UN WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2015‒2016: TRANSFORMING
ECONOMIES, REALIZING RIGHTS 162, 169‒70 (2015).
46. See supra notes 39‒45 and accompanying text.
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The UN has also pushed repeatedly for more permissive abortion laws through
TMBs.47 TMBs have called for abortion to be legalized in cases where
pregnancy results from rape or incest48 and where the continued pregnancy
would threaten the life49 or health50 of the mother. TMBs have also
recommended that in countries where abortion is legal, third-party authorization
for abortion be removed,51 legal and policy frameworks be established to enable
widespread access to abortion,52 and programs be developed to provide abortion
services.53
47. See infra notes 48‒54 and accompanying text.
48. Views of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Commc’n
No. 22/2009, L.C. v. Peru, ¶ 9(b)(i), (iii), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (Nov. 4, 2011)
[hereinafter “CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru”]; Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rights: Costa Rica, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/CRI/CO/4/Corr.1 (Apr. 22, 2008) [hereinafter
“CESCR: Costa Rica”]; Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women: Honduras, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HON/CO/6 (Aug. 10, 2007); Concluding
Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Chile, ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/CHL/CO/3
(Apr. 23, 2007); Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights:
Monaco, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/MCO/CO/1 (Jun. 13, 2006) [hereinafter “CESCR: Monaco”];
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Malta, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.101 (Dec. 14, 2004) [hereinafter “CESCR: Malta”]; Concluding Observations of the
Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Chile, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.105 (Dec. 1,
2004); Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Sri Lanka, ¶ 283, U.N. Doc. A/57/38, (Feb. 1, 2002); Concluding Observations of the Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights: Nepal, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Sept. 24, 2001);
Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
Colombia, ¶ 393, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter “CEDAW: Colombia”].
49. CESCR: Costa Rica, supra note 48, ¶ 46; Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Brazil, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BRA/CO/6
(Aug. 10, 2007); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Chile, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5 (May 18, 2007); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.:
Madagascar, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MDG/CO/3 (May 11, 2007); Concluding Comments of the
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Nicaragua, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/NIC/CO/6 (Feb. 2, 2007); Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No.
1153/2003, K.L. v. Peru, ¶ 6.2‒6.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (Nov. 22, 2005)
[hereinafter “HRC: K.L. v. Peru”]; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Poland,
¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL (Dec. 2, 2004); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: Colombia, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/80/COL (May 26, 2004); Concluding Observations
of the Human Rights Comm.: Guatemala, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/GTM (Aug. 27, 2001);
Comment No. 28 of the Human Rights Comm. on the Equality of Rights Between Men and Women,
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) [hereinafter “HRC Gen. Comment
28”]; Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Ecuador, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.92 (Aug. 18, 1998).
50. CESCR: Monaco, supra note 48, ¶ 23; CESCR: Malta, supra note 48, ¶ 41; CEDAW:
Colombia, supra note 48, ¶ 393; Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Gen. Recommendation No. 24, ¶ 12(d), U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter
“CEDAW Gen. Recommendation 24”]; Concluding Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women: Dominican Republic, ¶ 337, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998).
51. HRC Gen. Comment 28, supra note 49, ¶ 20.
52. CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru, supra note 48, ¶ 9.
53. CEDAW Gen. Recommendation 24, supra note 50, ¶ 31(c).
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Although it would not be possible to comment on every occasion in which
TMBs have recommended more permissive abortion laws, a few anecdotes
capture the general logic and procedure of the pro-abortion agenda as carried out
through TMBs.54 In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) recommended that Burkina Faso “review its
legislation on abortion and provide for coverage by social security.”55 After the
ICPD, Burkina Faso had already changed its abortion laws, ending its complete
ban on abortion and allowing abortion to protect a woman’s health, in cases of
rape and incest, and in cases where an unborn baby presents a fetal impairment.56
However, these changes did not satisfy CEDAW.57 More recently, in 2014, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)—the Committee that monitors the
Convention on the Rights of the Child—issued a report demanding that the Holy
See change its position on abortion and recommending that “the Holy See
undertake the necessary steps . . . to ensure that the Convention has precedence
over internal laws and regulations.”58 Given that the Holy See is widely known
to hold a specific religious perspective on abortion, the CRC report is quite
bold.59
The recent developments in Luxembourg discussed above illustrate the
manner in which TMBs interact with the UPR to promote abortion.60 The UPR
is a mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) that allows Member
States to offer recommendations to one another regarding compliance with
international human rights law.61 Several nations have been using the UPR to
recommend that other nations modify their abortion laws.62 European countries

54. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Comm. on the Rights of
the Child: the Holy See, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/VAT/CO/2 (Feb. 25, 2014) [hereinafter “CRC:
Holy See”]; Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Burkina Faso, ¶ 276, U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (2000) [hereinafter “CEDAW: Burkina Faso”].
55. CEDAW: Burkina Faso, supra note 54, ¶ 276.
56. See Loi No. 043/96/ADP, ch. II, § 3, art. 387 (Nov. 13, 1996) (Burk. Faso) (outlining a
law concerning abortion).
57. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
58. CRC: Holy See, supra note 54, ¶ 12.
59. See 1983 CODE c. 1398, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P57.HTM (stating
that obtaining an abortion is grounds for excommunication from the Catholic Church).
60. See supra notes 2‒8 and accompanying text.
61. See Rep. of the Human Rights Council to the General Assembly on the Fifth Session of
the Council, Annex.II.1. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/21 (Aug. 7, 2007).
62. See DATABASE OF UPR RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.upr-info.org/database/ (last
visited Jan. 5, 2016). As of January 5, 2016, the UPR database contained ninety-seven
recommendations with specific references to “abortion” and forty-six additional recommendations
with specific references to “reproductive rights.” See id. (running searches for both “abortion” and
“reproductive rights” as key words). Of the ninety-seven recommendations pertaining to abortion,
ninety-one can be interpreted as urging the Member States under review to liberalize their abortion
laws. Id. (running a search for the term “abortion”). Additionally, of the ninety-one
recommendations, eighty-three were made by European countries, and sixty-six of the ninety-one
recommendations targeted Latin American countries. Id. (running a search for the term “abortion”).

418

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:409

made the vast majority of these recommendations, which are primarily directed
at Latin American countries.63 Since the ICPD, the UN has developed a complex
and potent system to advocate for permissive abortion laws, the effects of which
come into focus upon consideration of the countries that have explicitly cited
international treaties or TMB decisions when changing their abortion laws.64
II. THE IMPACT OF PRO-ABORTION INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
Although no international human rights treaty mentions abortion, these
treaties have nevertheless been interpreted by several signatory nations to
require legalized abortion.65 Generally, abortion advocates claim that a right to
abortion is implied by rights addressed in a treaty—including the rights to health
care, life, nondiscrimination, equality, security, liberty, privacy, and religion, as
well as the rights to be free from cruel or inhuman treatment and to determine
the number and spacing of one’s children.66 Such arguments typically describe
the unborn child as a fetus, embryo, or simply a pregnancy.67 Abortion
advocates then suggest reasons to conclude that the unborn child may be a threat
to a mother’s enjoyment of her rights.68 These premises suggest that the mother

63. Id.
64. See infra Parts II‒III.
65. See SAN JOSE ARTICLES, art. 5 (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.sanjosearticles.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/SJA.pdf. There are no international treaties that mention abortion, and
there is only one regional treaty that mentions abortion: the Maputo Protocol. Assembly of the
African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, (July 11, 2003), http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/
achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf (signed in Maputo, Mozambique) [hereinafter “Maputo
Protocol”]. The Maputo Protocol is binding on signatory States in the African Union and went into
effect when the minimum of fifteen of the fifty African Union Member States ratified it in 2005.
Id. at art. 29, § 1; see Ratification Table: Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016)
[hereinafter “Ratification Table: Maputo Protocol”]. Article 14 § 2(c) of the Protocol reads: “States
Parties shall take all appropriate measures to . . . protect the reproductive rights of women by
authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued
pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the
fetus.” See Maputo Protocol, supra, art. 14, § 2(c). Although thirty-six African countries have
ratified the Maputo Protocol, its international impact is limited because it is a regional treaty and
because several of the States that signed the treaty did so with reservations stating that the language
on abortion is not binding on them. See Ratification Table: Maputo Protocol, supra.
66. See generally International Human Rights Law and Abortion in Latin America, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (2005), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/wrd0106/wrd0106.pdf.
67. See, e.g., id.
68. See, e.g., Dhikta v. Nepal, (2009), writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007), *4 (Nepal),
excerpts translated in Lakshmi Dhikta Case Summary and Translated Excerpts, REPROD. RTS.,
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lakshmi%20Dhikta
%20-%20English%20translation.pdf.
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has a right to protect herself by electing to prevent the child from being born.69
This argument is granted legitimacy by the fact that the international human
rights treaties are not specific about when life begins, whether at conception,
birth, or some other point in time.70
The influence of this type of reasoning is evident in a 2009 decision from the
Supreme Court of Nepal.71 Prior to 2002, Nepal had a complete ban on
abortion.72 In 2002, the Nepalese Government amended its laws to permit ondemand abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.73 Overnight, Nepal
went from having one of the most restrictive abortion laws to one of the most
liberal.74 After this change, many Nepalese women still, in practice, lacked
access to abortion.75
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Nepal in Dhikta v. Nepal76 ruled that the
Nepalese Government needed to: (1) introduce a more comprehensive abortion
law; (2) take measures to provide all Nepalese women access to abortion; and
(3) fund all abortions for women who cannot afford the procedure.77 In its
opinion, the court explained that Nepal’s prior law completely banning abortion
was “inappropriate and unusual” from the “point of view of compliance with
international norms.”78 Furthermore, the court stated that without the right to
abortion, the “rights guaranteed to women under international treaties . . . would
become unachievable.”79 The court cited U.S. Supreme Court and Austrian
Constitutional Court cases for its determination that the unborn child cannot be
deemed a legal person.80 Although no international law explicitly required
Nepal to permit abortions, the Supreme Court of Nepal found this requirement
to be implicit in international treaties.81 UN impact on this decision is visible

69. See id.
70. See International Human Rights Law and Abortion in Latin America, supra note 66, at 9‒
10. The American Convention on Human Rights, a regional treaty often referred to as the Pact of
San Jose, is exceptional in stating that the right to life “shall be protected by law and, in general,
from the moment of conception.” American Convention on Human Rights (‘Pact of San Jose,
Costa Rica’) (1969), art. 4, § 1, in SANDY GHANDHI, BLACKSTONE’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 376 (Oxford Univ. Press, 7th ed. 2010).
71. Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) at *4.
72. S. Cohen, Nepal Reforms Abortion Law To Reduce Maternal Deaths, Promote Women’s
Status, GUTTMACHER INST. (2002), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/2/gr050213.html.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) at *11.
76. (2009), writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) (Nepal).
77. Id. at *9‒13.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *7‒8.
80. Id. at *2.
81. See supra notes 78‒79 and accompanying text.
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both in the cited influence of international treaties and the reference to
“compliance with international norms.”82
It is impossible, for the reasons already mentioned, to determine precisely
whether these changes are more influenced by the UN or international norms.83
Still, it is indisputable that prior to the Dhikta opinion, the UN functioned as a
forum for advancing the kinds of ideas about treaty law that informed the
Nepalese Supreme Court’s decision.84 It is hard to imagine that the Nepalese
Supreme Court could have independently arrived at a reading of international
law that is simultaneously so far divorced from the actual content of the relevant
treaties, and so close to the interpretation for which the UN has energetically
advocated.85
A 1991 ruling by the Belgian Court of Arbitration evinced a similar
reasoning.86 In 1997, Belgium submitted its periodic report to the HRC, wherein
it detailed its compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).87 In detailing its compliance with Article 23 of the ICCPR, the
Belgian Government explained that in an effort to take “appropriate steps to
ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage during
the marriage,” the Belgian Court of Arbitration ruled that husbands do not have
a right to be consulted in a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion.88 This
decision made abortions more easily accessible for some women.89 In its
reasoning, the Belgian Court cited Article 23 of the ICCPR when stating, “even
a broad interpretation of article 23 of the Covenant does not make it possible to
include therein procedural rights such as those that would derive from the right
of the husband to be consulted.”90
The Nepalese and Belgian cases are examples of when national judiciaries
have explicitly grounded their decisions about abortion law in a specific
interpretation of international law advanced by powerful forces within the UN.91
82. See supra notes 78‒79 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 9‒20 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 1‒10 and accompanying text; Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067
(2007) at *4.
85. Compare Dhikta, writ petition no. WO-0757, 2067 (2007) at *4, with Concluding
Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Nepal, ¶ 148, U.N.
Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter “CEDAW: Nepal”]. Prior to 2002, when Nepal had a
complete ban on abortion, various UN agencies began pressuring the government to liberalize its
abortion laws. See id. For example, in 1999, CEDAW’s concluding comments on Nepal “urge[d]
the Government to revise existing legislation and to reconsider [its proposed law] so as to provide
services for safe abortions.” Id.
86. See Human Rights Comm. Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1994: Belgium,
¶ 315, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/Add.3 (Oct. 15, 1997).
87. Id. ¶ 11.
88. Id. ¶ 315.
89. See, e.g., id.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 78‒82, 86‒90 and accompanying text.
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With regard to abortion laws, UN interpretation of international treaties has
become increasingly influential, while the influence of the actual text of treaties
has correspondingly diminished.92 The UN is successfully holding nations
responsible, not to the negotiated text of international treaties, but to the
normative positions of various UN organs and bodies.93
The UN’s revisionist interpretation of treaties has also had an impact on how
national legislatures confront abortion.94 Ethiopia stated that it changed abortion
laws to comply with international treaties.95 In 2005, Ethiopia amended its penal
code to allow abortion up through twenty-eight weeks gestation96 when a
woman’s health or life is at risk, as well as in cases of rape, incest, fetal
impairment, when the pregnant person is a minor, or where the woman has a
physical or psychological disability or injury.97 Prior to this amendment,
abortion had been illegal unless performed to preserve the health or life of the
pregnant woman or, in certain circumstances, in response to conditions of
extreme poverty.98 The amended law went into effect in 2005, and shortly
thereafter, the Ethiopian Government implemented a document entitled
Technical and Procedural Guideline for Safe Abortion Services.99 In this
document, the Government detailed that it partially expanded its abortion law to
comply with international law.100 The document states:
Ethiopia has ratified international human rights conventions and
treaties that are legally binding and that form international law. The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), which provides the foundation for
reproductive rights, is one such notable convention. The Tehran
Proclamation, the International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD), the Fourth World Congress on Women, and the
2000 United Nations (UN) Summit are some of the major forums at
which national governments have expressed their commitment to
improving the status of women in society. These and other
international initiatives have yielded wider recognition of individuals’
92. See infra notes 116‒17 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 48‒53 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 100‒01 and accompanying text.
95. Technical and Procedural Guideline for Safe Abortion Services in Ethiopia, Part I, HARV.
(May 2006), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Ethiopia.abo.html.
96. Making Abortion Services Accessible in the Wake of Legal Reforms: A Framework and
Six Case Studies, GUTTMACHER INST. 4 (Apr. 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/abortionservices-laws.pdf.
97. Proclamation No. 414/2004, Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, art. 551 (2004) (Eth.), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Ethiopia.abo.
html.
98. Penal Code 158/1957, art. 533‒34 (1957) (Eth.).
99. See Technical and Procedural Guideline for Safe Abortion Services in Ethiopia, supra
note 95.
100. Id. at Part I.
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rights to lead safe and responsible reproductive lives and have
underscored the responsibility of governments to not only respect
those rights but also to create the legal and policy environment for
their realization.101
The Government explained its decision to expand abortion access in terms of its
recognition of reproductive rights as discussed in several UN documents and
conferences.102 According to the Ethiopian Government, the influence of UN
treaties was significant in providing it with the impetus to change its laws.103
The Ethiopian Government added:
At the UN summit in 2000, governments of the world ratified the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an international tool for
reducing poverty and improving the standard of living in the
developing world. One of the eight MDGs is to reduce the maternal
mortality rate by 75% (from 1990 levels) by the year 2015. Preventing
unsafe abortion is one of the five strategies for reducing maternal
mortality that was endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO)
in 2004.
In response to these developments at the global level and changes in
social and gender relations within the country, the government of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has reviewed its
laws and policies within the last decade.104
As the Government reports, Ethiopia’s interpretation of international treaties
was shaped by non-binding recommendations from WHO and discussions at
several UN conferences.105
Chile may join Ethiopia in reaching the conclusion that international law
requires the recognition of a right to abortion.106 Currently, Chile’s law imposes
a total ban on abortion.107 Yet, in January 2015, President Michelle Bachelet—
the former head of UN Women—sent a proposal to the Chilean Congress to
legalize abortion.108 The law would allow abortions through the twelfth week
of pregnancy when the mother’s life is deemed at risk, in cases of rape, or when

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Lamentable: Presidente Bachelet Presenta Proyecto de Despenalización del Aborto en
Chile, [Unfortunate: President Bachelet Has Proposed Decriminalization of Abortion in Chile]
ARGENTINOS ALERTA (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.argentinosalerta.org/noticia/3133-lamentablepresidente-bachelet-presenta-proyecto-de-despenalizacion-del-aborto-en-chile.
107. Chile’s President Bachelet Proposes End to Total Abortion Ban, BBC (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31076838.
108. Lamentable: Presidente Bachelet Presenta Proyecto de Despenalización del Aborto en
Chile, supra note 106.
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the fetus is deformed and will not survive.109 In defending her proposal,
Bachelet claimed that Chile’s laws constitute a breach of international
obligations.110 This is a case where one of the bureaucrats responsible for
developing pro-abortion soft law at the UN attempts to persuade her nation of
the legitimacy of her reading of international law.111 Observing whether she
succeeds will provide intriguing data about the influence of UN treaties and UN
interpretations of treaty law on national abortion law.
III. THE IMPACT OF ABORTION ADVOCACY BY TMBS
TMBs’ actions have played a major role in causing treaties that do not mention
abortion to become associated with a purported right to abortion.112 Each
international treaty that deals with human rights has been assigned a treaty
monitoring body, which is a committee made up of independent experts.113 The
function of a TMB is to monitor signatory States’ compliance with the treaty in
question.114 TMBs carry out this function by offering recommendations in
response to the required periodic reports submitted by signatory nations and by
issuing quasi-judicial decisions in response to claims brought by individuals
against signatory nations.115 Recently, TMBs frequently have claimed that
nations with restrictive abortion laws are not in compliance with international
treaties, notwithstanding the fact that those treaties do not mention abortion.116
TMBs have become a powerful mechanism for advancing the view that a
commitment to internationally recognized human rights requires permissive
abortion laws.117
Recent developments in Bolivia demonstrate the effectiveness of TMBs in
influencing national abortion laws.118 Bolivia’s abortion law permits abortion
109. Chile’s President Bachelet Proposes End to Total Abortion Ban, supra note 107.
110. Lamentable: Presidente Bachelet Presenta Proyecto de Despenalización del Aborto en
Chile, supra note 106.
111. See id.
112. See supra notes 12, 48‒53 and accompanying text.
113. Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. (2015), www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx.
114. See id.
115. Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/WhatTBdo.aspx.
Generally, a TMB can only carry out this quasi-judicial function for signatory nations that have
acceded to an optional protocol allowing this mechanism. See id.
116. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 12.
117. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 39, at 88‒90.
118. See infra notes 119‒25 and accompanying text. CEDAW’s interaction with Namibia
provides an example of TMB recommendations on abortion failing to produce change. See List of
Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Periodic Reports of the Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Namibia, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/NAM/O/3 (Aug. 4, 2006). CEDAW asked Namibia to evaluate its abortion laws and
in response, the Namibian Ministry of Health proposed a draft law on abortion in 1996. Id. This
law was withdrawn in 1999, however, because a majority of Namibians opposed the law. Id.
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when a woman’s life, physical health, or mental health are deemed impaired by
the pregnancy, as well as in cases of rape or incest.119 However, the law
originally required women to receive judicial authorization prior to the
abortion.120
In 2014, Bolivia’s Constitutional Court invalidated this
requirement.121 In justifying its decision, the court relied heavily on TMB
interpretations of international law.122 It specifically noted the recommendations
of the HRC,123 the Committee Against Torture (CAT), and CEDAW, to which
CAT instructed Bolivia to refer.124 While factors other than the influence of
these TMBs were presumably relevant, the sequence of events—restrictive
abortion law, recommendation from the TMBs, and changed abortion law that
uses reasoning explicitly based on the TMBs’ recommendation—is a telling
testimony to the influence that bureaucratic entities tasked with monitoring an
international treaty have over domestic law.125
Chad, like Bolivia, amended its abortion legislation in response to a TMB
recommendation.126 In 1997, Chad prepared its initial periodic report to the
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), detailing the ways in which it had
been complying with the treaty.127 In 1999, the CRC reviewed Chad’s report
and issued concluding observations regarding Chad’s compliance.128 In those
observations, the CRC asked Chad to review its legislation prohibiting abortion
and to undertake studies “to understand . . . the negative impact of . . . illegal
abortion.”129 Less than three years later, in 2002, Chad greatly relaxed
restrictions on abortions, broadly expanding the instances in which abortions

119. Aborto Impune [Unpunished Abortion], Bolivia Código Penal, art. 266 (Bol.), http://
www.hsph.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Bolivia.abo.htm.
120. See id.
121. Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional 0206/2014, Constitutional Court, Part III, § 8.8
(2014) (Bol.).
122. Id.
123. Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of the Human Rights Comm. of
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/BOL/CO/3 (Dec. 6, 2013).
124. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Comm. Against Torture
of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 50th Sess., ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/BOL/CO/2 (Jun. 14, 2013);
Sentencia Constitucional Plurinacional 0206/2014, Part III, § 8.8.
125. See supra notes 118‒24 and accompanying text.
126. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1997:
Chad, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TCD/2 (Aug. 14, 2007) [hereinafter “CRC: Chad 2007”].
127. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1992, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/3/Add.50 (Jul. 24, 1997).
128. Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: Chad, 21st Sess., ¶
30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.107 (Aug. 24, 1999).
129. Id.
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may be performed legally.130 In its periodic report covering 1999‒2006,131 Chad
described its decision to change its abortion laws as follows: “In response to the
Committee’s concluding observations . . . the Government adopted a series of
measures . . . on the promotion of reproductive health.”132
Colombia provides another example of heavy judicial reliance on TMB
recommendations.133 Before 2006, abortion was completely illegal in
Colombia.134 In 2006, the Colombian Constitutional Court legalized abortion,
without specification as to gestational limit, when (1) the pregnancy threatens
the woman’s health or life; (2) the fetus is deemed to have malformations
incompatible with life; or (3) the pregnancy is the result of another’s criminal
acts such as rape, incest, or artificial insemination without the woman’s
consent.135 In explaining its decision, the court pointed to the non-binding
recommendations of several TMBs.136 In fact, the court’s opinion lists every
TMB recommendation about abortion, starting with recommendations from the
HRC under the ICCPR,137 CEDAW,138 CRC,139 Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD),140 and CAT.141 The examples of Bolivia,
Chad, and Colombia demonstrate the influence of TMB recommendations on
abortion laws.
TMBs also have influenced abortion laws through the exercise of their quasijudicial functions. A recent decision of the National Supreme Court of
Argentina demonstrates the impact that TMBs’ quasi-judicial functions can have
on domestic abortion laws.142 In 2012, the court adopted a novel interpretation
of Argentina’s penal code, holding that the code allowed abortion in all rape
cases.143 Previously, only women with mental disabilities were explicitly
permitted to obtain abortions in cases of rape.144 In its decision, the court stated
its concern that failure to broaden permissive abortions might compromise
130. Loi 006/PR/2002 Portant Promotion de la Santé de Reproduction [On the Promotion of
Reproductive Health], art. 14 (2002).
131. CRC: Chad 2007, supra note 126, ¶ 14.
132. Id.
133. See infra notes 134‒41 and accompanying text.
134. Abortion Ruling in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/05/24/opinion/24weds3.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
135. Sentencia C-355/06, Constitucional Court, Part VI, ¶ 10.1, 10.3 (2006) (Colom.), http://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm.
136. See infra notes 137‒41 and accompanying text.
137. Sentencia C-355/06, supra note 135, at Part V, ¶ 6.5.
138. Id. at Part V, ¶ 6.5.3‒6.5.4.
139. Id. at Part V, ¶ 6.5.5.
140. Id. at Part V, ¶ 6.5.6.
141. Id. at Part V, ¶ 6.5.7.
142. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
13/3/2012, “A.F. c. O.C./medida autosatisfactiva,” Fallos [F.] (2012-259-XLVI) (Arg.).
143. Id. ¶ 17.
144. Id. ¶ 15‒16.
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Argentina’s responsibility to the international legal system in light of the fact
that international bodies had censured several nations for their restrictive
abortion laws.145 The year before this decision, Argentina itself had been
criticized by the HRC in LMR v. Argentina (also known as VDA v. Argentina),146
for not ensuring access to legal abortion for a mentally impaired woman who
sought an abortion after a suspected rape by her uncle.147 The Supreme Court
of Argentina ordered the performance of the abortion, but no hospital would
carry it out, and the woman was forced to seek an illegal abortion.148 When the
case was brought to the HRC, the Committee stated that, by not ensuring access
to a legal abortion, Argentina had violated the woman’s right to privacy and right
not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.149 This case
provides another example of the understanding that access to abortion is
guaranteed by other unrelated rights.150 Indeed, according to LMR’s
representatives, Argentina had violated the woman’s rights to life, equal
treatment, and freedom of thought and conscience.151
Twisting the text of international treaties in this manner violates the standard
practices of treaty interpretation.152 Nevertheless, this practice has become
widespread among the bureaucrats responsible for monitoring treaty compliance
and through the influence of TMBs, and has contributed to the liberalization of
domestic abortion laws.153
Quasi-judicial TMB functions have also seemingly contributed to
developments in abortion policy in Peru, but here the efficacy of TMBs in
influencing change is less clear.154 Since 1924, the only legal form of abortion
in Peru has been therapeutic abortion.155 Abortion can be performed only when
necessary to save the life of, or prevent serious and permanent damage to, the
pregnant woman.156 When it signed the ICPD, Peru made a reservation stating

145. Id. ¶ 6, 26‒27.
146. See Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina,
¶ 9.2‒11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Apr. 28, 2011).
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 2.6‒2.8.
149. Id. ¶ 9.2‒9.3.
150. See id. ¶ 9.2‒9.4.
151. Id. ¶ 8.5, 9.2‒10.
152. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
153. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 39, at 88‒90.
154. See infra notes 155‒67 and accompanying text.
155. Keys to Understanding Peru’s New Therapeutic Abortion Guidelines, PERU THIS WEEK
(Jul. 1, 2014), http://www.peruthisweek.com/news-keys-to-understanding-perus-new-therapeuticabortion-guidelines-103385.
156. Decreto Legislativo No. 635, Codigo Penal, art. 119 (1991) (Peru), http://www.cajpe.org.
pe/rij/bases/legisla/peru/pecodpen.htm.
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that life begins at conception.157 In recent years, TMBs have put significant
pressure on Peru to make changes in its abortion laws and policies.158 In
particular, two cases—K.L. v. Peru159 and L.C. v. Peru160—have been brought
before the HRC and CEDAW, respectively.161 In K.L. v. Peru, the HRC
determined that Peru had violated several articles of the ICCPR by refusing to
authorize the abortion of an anencephalic baby.162 In L.C. v. Peru, CEDAW
ruled that Peru had violated several articles of CEDAW by not ensuring that a
woman impregnated from rape received an abortion to allow the timely
performance of a surgery she needed to prevent severe spinal cord injuries.163
In these decisions, the HRC and CEDAW made several recommendations,
including that Peru establish a mechanism to ensure the rapid availability of
abortion services in cases where a mother’s life or health is severely threatened,
and amend its law to permit abortions in cases of rape.164 Recently, Peru has
followed the first of these recommendations, offering national guidelines for the
provision of abortion services.165 These guidelines lay out eleven circumstances
in which the threat to the mother’s life created by a pregnancy is considered
grave enough to warrant abortion, and they establish a procedure for determining
in a timely fashion whether abortion is permissible.166 However, rape is still not
considered a sufficient justification for abortion.167
While Peru has partially resisted TMB pressure, it standardized the procedure
for obtaining abortions.168 It is possible that this standardization will lead to an
increasing number of abortions in Peru. Either way, TMB decisions have

157. Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population & Dev., supra note 21, at ch. V, ¶ 30.
158. See CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru, supra note 48, ¶ 9; HRC: K.L. v. Peru, supra note 49, ¶ 6.3,
7‒9.
159. HRC: K.L. v. Peru, supra note 49.
160. CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru, supra note 48.
161. HRC: K.L. v. Peru, supra note 49; CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru, supra note 48.
162. HRC: K.L. v. Peru, supra note 49, ¶ 6.3‒7.
163. CEDAW: L.C. v. Peru, supra note 48, ¶ 8.18‒9. The surgery had been delayed because
of the pregnancy, according to L.C.’s representatives. Id. ¶ 2.4. Peru claimed that it was delayed
for a medical reason unrelated to the pregnancy. Id. ¶ 8.8.
164. Id. ¶ 9.
165. See Guía Técnica Nacional para la Estandarización del Procedimiento de la Atención
Integral de la Gestante en la Interrupción Voluntaria por Indicación Terapéutica del Embarazo
Menor de 22 Semanas con Consentimiento Informado en el Marco de lo Dispuesto en el Artículo
119o del Código Penal [National Technical Guide for Procedure Standardization of Comprehensive
Care for Pregnant [Women] in Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, Therapeutic Indication for
Less Than 22 Weeks with Informed Consent Under the Provisions in Article 119 of the Penal
Code], ¶ 6.1 (2014) (Peru) [hereinafter “Guía Técnica Nacional”].
166. See id. ¶ 6.1.
167. Peru Lawmakers Reject Bill To Allow Abortions for Pregnant Rape Victims, GUARDIAN
(May 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/27/peru-bill-to-abortions-pregnantrape.
168. See Guía Técnica Nacional, supra note 165, ¶ 6.1.
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already contributed to significant changes in the way Peru handles abortion
policy.169
IV. CONCLUSION
If one finds trustworthy political actors’ reports of their own motives, then it
is clear that various UN bodies—rather than the actual UN Member States—
have influenced abortion law transformations.170 In the past, Member States
have been more or less in control of UN processes, with the result that negotiated
international treaties do not lean toward controversial positions. In recent years,
however, internal UN actors have gained more influence and begun to use the
UN to advance a specific agenda.171 Since the ICPD, the UN has developed a
multifaceted system for advocating for permissive abortion laws.172 UN entities,
such as UN Women, UNFPA, and WHO, advance the position that access to
abortion is a right held by all women. TMBs pressure countries to change their
abortion laws through concluding comments and quasi-judicial decisions. The
UPR provides pro-abortion countries a forum in which they can join UN efforts
to pressure countries with less permissive abortion laws. This system has led
countries to interpret treaties ostensibly unrelated to abortion as requiring the
allowance or promotion of abortion. In this international legal climate, it has
become less important that treaty law says nothing about national abortion
policies. International soft law has grown in influence, at least in relation to this
aspect of national law, and has played a role in reshaping domestic abortion laws.
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